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The editor of this Symposium in his Introduction expresses the
hope that "the reader will find in our aggregate endeavor a clear
and comprehensive portrait of this extraordinary Judge."' Happily,
however, we are not obliged to judge this collection of essays on
Mr. Justice Black solely against Editor Strickland's ambitiously stated
hope, for certainly this Symposium does not present such a portrait.
Mr. Justice Black was appointed to the Supreme Court by Presi-
dent Roosevelt in 1937, after an eleven-year stint as Senator Black
of Alabama. Black's appointment followed immediately upon the
defeat of the President's Court-packing plan and inspired shortly
thereafter a series of Pulitizer Prize winning newspaper articles re-
telling the story of Black's former Klan connections. Thus, his
career as a Justice commenced amidst much public controversy and
discussion, a characteristic which continued unabated for the next
thirty years.
Only eight other Justices have served on the Court as long as Mr.
Justice Black,2 and only one, the first Mr. Justice Harlan, has pro-
duced a greater volume than the 780-odd opinions written by Black.3
From his first term, when he spoke for the Court in Johnson v.
Zerbst,4 upholding the right to raise denial of counsel questions by
habeas corpus,5 through the most recent full term, during which
t Staff, American Council of Education, Washington, D.C.
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3 See Warren, Introduction to Symposium-Mr. Justice Black: Thirty Years in
Retrospect, 14 U.C.L.A.L. R-v. 397 (1967).
'304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Justice has maintained his interest in habeas corpus.
In 1963 he delivered the Court's opinion in Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963),
upholding the right of a prisoner to test the legality of his conviction and imprisonment,
even though he is "out" on parole.5 Counsel for petitioner in Johnson v. Zerbst also became a Judge who has been
notably courageous and vigilant in defense of individual liberty and equality before
the law-Judge Elbert P. Tuttle of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
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he delivered the majority opinion in Adderley v. Florida,6 upholding
trespass convictions based on protest demonstrations at a jail house,
Mr. Justice Black has been at or very near the center of the most
important and dramatic legal developments affecting the nature and
quality of life in this country. On many of these questions, in-
cluding the right of an accused to the assistance of counsel7 and
the right to equal representation," his originally rejected positions
have in time and through his persistence prevailed.
Little wonder then that a modest collection of nine short essays,
totalling only 273 pages of text, would be insufficient to deal with
contributions of the volume, importance, and complexity of Black's
in a manner which could appropriately be said to paint "a clear and
comprehensive portrait." There are obvious gaps in the coverage
of this Symposium, such as the absence of adequate discussions of
the biographical facts about Mr. Justice Black, particularly his early
career before going to the Senate," of his substantial contributions
in such areas as labor law, jury trial, and maritime law,10 and of the
recurrent clashes between Black's views and those of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter. Finally, one can only bemoan the absence of any real
dissenters or critics in this Symposium; that there have been and
are critics of stature is surely a necessary and integral part of any
story about Hugo Black." It is in fact somewhat incongruous that
a symposium on the country's best known and most effective
champion of the right to criticize and dissent would not include
representative selections from authors exercising that right.12 In
this connection, I would suggest that the word "symposium" itself
implies a freer exchange of more diverse ideas, and since a sym-
' 385 U.S. 89 (1966).
7 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 35 (1963), overruling Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942).
8 See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), overruling Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549 (1946).
' An excellent summary is found in I. DILLIARD, Mr. Justice Black: A Personal
Appreciation, in ONE MAN'S STAND FOR FREEDOM: MR. JusTicE BLACK AND =hE BILL OF
RGHTS 1-27 (1963).
10 Some of these particular topics are considered in the special January, 1967, sym-
posium issue of the U.C.L.A. Law Review, Symposium-Mr. Justice Black: Thirty Years
in Retrospect, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 397 (1967).
"
1 See, e.g., Griswold, Absolute Is In The Dark, 8 UTAE L. REv. 167 (1963).
1 2 Although the Justice has said that he would not want people making speeches
against the Supreme Court in his house, Justice Black and First Amendment "Abso-
lutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 549, 558 (1962), certainly he would not
have objected to a more representative discussion of his views.
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posium was originally a drinking party,13 perhaps one is justified
in expecting that a little more heat would be generated than is the
case with Strickland's Symposium.
Nevertheless, neither absolute clarity nor absolute completeness
is attainable, and there does emerge from the readable essays com-
piled by Mr. Strickland a reasonably fair, acceptably complete, and
certainly stimulating picture of this unique individual, about whom
Mr. Justice Harlan recently wrote:
There can be little doubt that few men who have assumed the
responsibilities of this great office have laid them down with their
place in history better assured than will be the case with Mr.
Justice Black.14
And for the more sophisticated reader, at least one of the articles,
which will be discussed more fully later, poses and creatively dis-
cusses the most basic questions about Justice Black's constitutional
philosophy.15
Professor Swisher's opening article, "History's Panorama and
Justice Black's Career," seeks to locate Black in the historical
context in which he has lived and worked. He traces the changing
times from the New Deal through World War II, into the post-war
dilemmas of the McCarthy era and the Communist Cold War period,
and then up to current times. Swisher is particularly effective in
demonstrating how the expanded governmental activity of the New
Deal era prepared the way for the further concentration of power in
the federal government which occurred during the war years, and
how the war in part produced the questions of loyalty and subversion
which dominated the 1950's. Swisher also helpfully and briefly
deals with the other personalities of the Court during Black's tenure
and his relationship with them.
Swisher's article is followed by "The New Court and The New
1 Wrassmt, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY, p. 2318 (1961).
" Harlan, Mr. Justice Black-Remarks of a Colleague, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1967).
One of the most warming aspects of a Supreme Court clerkship is the opportunity to
observe the respect and affection which the Justices feel for each other. See, e.g.,
Black, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1521, 1522 (1965) ("I could not
have, even if I had tried, harbored ill will toward a man I knew to be so dedicated
to our country and its ideals. And so my initial respect and friendship for Felix sur-
vived all differences of opinion, in fact grew with the years, and left me with a feeling of
great loss when he died.")
15Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in STRICKLAND SYMPOSIUM
133.
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Deal," by John P. Frank, an early clerk to the Justice and author
of MR. JUSTICE BLACK: THE MAN AND HIS OPINIONS (1949). In
this selection, Frank quite properly points out that the preoccupa-
tion with Black as champion of the Bill of Rights has tended to
obscure the Justice's contributions as a New Dealer on the Court.
The Hugo Black on the Supreme Court today is properly thought
of as the inheritor of the tradition of Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison, but the Black who went to the Court was also
the special inheritor of the tradition of John Peter Altgeld and
of the elder Bob LaFollette, whose son was his close companion
in the Senate. The Black of the appointment was George Norris's
most effective Democratic ally. The Black whom F.D.R. sent to
the Court in 1937 was, in sum, the hard-hitting, infinitely energetic
representative of the Populist-Progressive-New Deal tradition in
America.16
Thus, Black, the New Dealer, has played the leading role in
the demise of "substantive due process" by which courts were
substituting their social and economic views for those represented
by laws passed by Congress or state legislatures. 17 In addition to
illuminating that side of Black which is now so often overlooked,
Frank's article also contains an admirably clear and simple explana-
tion and summary of Black's general philosophy of government, one
of which the Justice, who trails no man in clarity and simplicity
of writing style, would be proud. Frank points out that Black
is "Congress' man." Within express constitutional limits, Black
will enforce whatever Congress decides is desirable to fulfill na-
tional purposes. States have similar powers, subject, however, not
only to express constitutional limitations but also to the superior
power of Congress. The people can govern themselves through such
governments, all powerful in their proper domains, because there is
to be no restraint on their freedom to persuade each other. There
must be freedom of speech, press and belief, complete equality for
every citizen, and a prescribed and precise criminal procedure for
the citizen who is cross-wise with his government. And, finally,
there must be order. "Maintenance of an order in which the
powerful government of free men can function is the first duty of
any government."' 8
"
0Frank, The New Court and The New Deal, in STRICKLAND SYMPosimi 41.
17 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
28 Frank, supra note 16, at 72.
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After an interesting though not particularly significant discussion
of the race issue and its relationship to Black's career,19 the Sym-
posium moves to the more familiar story, told now by Irving Dilliard,
a long-time Black friend and admirer, in "The Individual and the
Bill of Absolute Rights." 20  Here is catalogued the great bulk of
Black's familiar contributions in the realm of human liberty-his
position that the Bill of Rights means what it says and is to be
enforced absolutely and literally, his conclusion that the fourteenth
amendment made the first eight amendments applicable to the
states, the high preferred place he would give to the first amend-
ment, his concern for the fundamental rights of an accused, and
his fight for reapportionment. Even the familiarity of the story
does not dilute the excitement with which it can be reviewed. As
Mr. Dilliard has previously said:
Beginning with the very foundations of the Republic, no one
else has stood up so resolutely over so long a period in times so
trying for the sacred freedoms of the individual American under
the Bill of Rights.21
The Symposium also contains articles discussing Black's partici-
pation in non-constitutional areas, such as federal taxation, antitrust,
and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where, as might be ex-
pected, he has held strong, straightforward, and usually influential
views.2 2 These articles help to round out the picture and certainly
are properly included in this work, although one may question
whether some of them, in particular "The Federal Civil Rules and
the Pursuit of Justice," are not somewhat more extensive than would
be desirable for this Symposium. There is also an article by the
editor discussing primarily the question of whether Black really
believes in the absolutes in the Bill of Rights.
Although the Justice is popularly conceived to be a "liberal,"
his constitutional philosophy is essentially conservative. As earlier
indicated, he allows federal and state governments the greatest of
latitude in making decisions concerning the welfare of our society.
' Berman, The Persistent Race Issue, in STRICKLAND SYMPoSIUM 75.2 0 STRICKLAND SYMPOSIUM 97.
211. Dnu.mA, Mr. Justice Black: A Personal Appreciation, in ONE MAN'S STAND
FOR FREEDoM: MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND THE BILL OF RIGHTs 27 (1963).
2 2 Black's view, shared with Mr. Justice Douglas, that the Federal Rules exceed
the authority of the Court has met with virtually no success, however. See Kaufman,
The Federal Civil Rules and the Pursuit of Justice, in STRICKLAND SYMPosIUM 223.
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He assumes power to subject those governments only to the ex-
plicit restrictions and commands of the Constitution. While he
would not "balance" away those explicit protections of freedom and
liberty, neither would he void distasteful laws unless he can find
justification in the Constitution for.doing so.23 He invariably looks
to the history of any constitutional provision to justify the reading
he gives it,24 and he vehemently denies the right or duty of the
Court "to keep the Constitution in tune with the times" 25-as situa-
tions from time to time appear, in the view of the majority of the
Court, to demand. How, then, did this judicial conservative come
by his reputation as liberal, civil libertarian, protector of the op-
pressed, the poor, and the defenseless, and defender of individual
liberty?
The easy, and indisputably correct, answer is that Black's reputa-
tion has been earned by his votes, for surely the result and not the
reasoning of a decided case accounts for its label of "liberal" or
"conservative." But such an answer of course does not satisfy. Can
"liberal" votes be produced by a "conservative" judicial philosophy?
Obviously much of the trouble lies with the labels; they say too
much or too little; and they are political labels not judicial ones.
Harvard's Professor Louis Jaffe has answered by concluding that
Mr. Justice Black's concept of judicial power is either illusory or
not in fact observed-by which he seems to say that the standards by
which the Justice purports to test legislation are either incapable of
affecting the outcome or are not permitted by the Justice to do so.
It is well to note, however, that Professor Jaffe has also reached the
same conclusion about the tests of "ordered liberty," "funda-
mental," and the reasonable beliefs of "right-minded men" adopted
by Mr. Justices Cardozo and Frankfurter,26 whose judicial philoso-
phies were often at odds with Justice Black's.n
In 1963 Professor Charles Reich, of the Yale faculty, explored
the operation of Justice Black's philosophy in an article that offered
23 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
21 The best known illustration of this is probably Adamson v. California, 332 U.S.
46, 68 (1947) (dissenting opinion).
2u Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
.-9 Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HAmv.
L. Rav. 986, 995-97 (1967).
27 In a similar vein, it has been questioned whether the exchange between Black
and Frankfurter has been meaningful or fruitful. See Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr.
Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 428, 441-42 (1967).
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answers to this question.2 Wisely, Mr. Strickland has seen fit to
include the major portion of that article in this Symposium, with the
title, "The Living Constitution and the Court's Role. '2  Not only
was Professor Reich's article unquestionably the most provocative
at the time it appeared, it also is, in my opinion, the outstanding
selection of this Symposium.
Professor Reich suggests that Black's demand for "faithful
adherence" to the Bill of Rights means "faithful adherence" to its
spirit and objectives. Black wants the Bill of Rights to accomplish
the same purposes in our contemporary setting as it was originally
designed to accomplish in an earlier setting. To do so, he interprets
the Bill of Rights in the light of changed conditions and growing
governmental power. In a dynamic society the Bill of Rights must
keep changing in its application or lose even its original meaning.
Reich recognizes the difficulty of reconciling this explanation with
Black's doctrine of "absolutes," but he maintains that the two are
not inconsistent. He regards Black's absolutism as more than just
a rejection of the "balancing test" by which one might normally
expect the Constitution to be changed or to grow; absolutism asks
judges to apply the balance originally struck in the Bill of Rights.
Thus, by beginning with the literal language of the Constitution, a
judge can maintain the fundamental structure and purposes of the
Constitution-the rule of law. And by emphasizing the underlying
purposes of the framers one can nevertheless make its provisions
meaningful in modem and changing times.
In a very real sense, Reich's article is a classical apology for the
views of Mr. Justice Black; it seeks to explain and justify "much
that he has not articulated." 30 It may be doubted that the Justice
would fully accept Professor Reich's explanation of his views, a
possibility which Reich himself recognized. 31 And others also
appear, at least on the surface, to disagree with Reich.
Professor Howard, of the Virginia Law School, has recently dealt
with one of the most mooted questions of the day, namely, whether
Justice Black's votes and opinions of recent years, particularly in
the sit-in and other direct action cases and in the Georgia Governor's
"
8 Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv. 673
(1963).
29 STRICKLAND SYMPOSIUM 133.
30 Id.
31Id. at 134.
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case, are consistent with his judicial philosophy and his earlier posi-
tions.32 Professor Howard states a convincing case that Black's
views have not changed-that his recent opinions are completely con-
sistent with his prior judicial philosophy. He finds the rule of law
to be the pervading principle-the rule of law which requires judges
to decide cases by reference to the precise wording of the Constitu-
tion, rather than their preferences, the rule of law which requires
grievances to be channeled into lawful processes, and the rule of
law which requires an open, free society in which one man can
persuade another.33
Although Howard's article emphasizes and accepts as a basic
premise Black's protestations that he will have no part in rewriting
or changing the Constitution, that view is not, in my opinion, in-
consistent with Professor Reich's explanation of Black's willingness
to adapt the Bill of Rights to current times. Basically, Black's adapta-
tions actually represent the continued adherence to a consistent read-
ing of the Bill of Rights applied to various situations by a Justice
who has an exceptional ability to perceive those evils against which
the Bill of Rights originally sought to protect, regardless of what new
forms those evils might take. Further, as Reich says, the Justice's
dedication to the rule of law, expressed in large part through his
doctrine of "absolutes," gives structure and purpose (and perhaps
legitimacy) to the Justice's philosophy, and operates to prevent
erosion of cherished freedoms, particularly in difficult times. Such
"changes," then, are consistent with the rule of law and are not only
accomplished within its framework but are in fact assisted by it.
Reich's article shows primarily how the Justice's attitudes and
philosophy have supported "liberal causes." Howard has shown
how, particularly in recent years, they have supported "conservative"
positions. It certainly would be strange if any mature and principled
constitutional philosophy did not sometimes produce a "liberal"
result, and sometimes a "conservative" result. And certainly it is
to Black's everlasting credit that he has accepted the "conservative"
result when it appears to him to be required by his own constitu-
tional philosophy.34
32 Howard, Mr. Justice Black: The Negro Protest Movement and the Rule of Law,
53 VA. L. Rzv. 1030 (1967).
3Id. at 1085-86.
"4See Freund, Mr. Justice Black and the Judicial Function, 14 U.C.L.A.L. Rav.
467, 474 (1967).
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Since, as I view it, there has been no change in the Justice's
philosophy and no absence of fidelity to that philosophy, the only
question that remains is whether there may have been some change
in attitude that has produced different results. For example, would
in earlier years the Justice have found some way, consistent with his
judicial views, to offer more refuge to those who sit in or demon-
strate in other ways? I doubt it, for the Justice's dedication to the
maintenance of order and the avoidance of violence is too deeply
felt.35 The Georgia Governor's case36 for me is more difficult. I
have no quarrel with the Court's conclusion that nothing in the Con-
stitution prohibits the legislature from participating in the elec-
tive process. But in the Georgia case the apparent will of the people
was frustrated by a malapportioned legislature. Even though the
malapportioned legislature had been permitted to function until
May, 1968, one wonders why Black rejected the argument that the
election of a Governor is beyond the scope of the ordinary duties
which a malapportioned legislature can, consistent with the Consti-
tution, be permitted to perform.37 Mr. Justice Black did not ex-
plain why this distinction did not persuade him. Perhaps some day
he will.
CLAY C. LONG*
" Howard, supra note 32, at 1033-47.
"Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966).
"See The Supreme Court-1966 Term, 81 HARV. L. REv. 110, 146-48 (1967).
0 Member of the Georgia Bar; former law clerk for Justice Black.
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